Antitrust Law and Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach by Gerber, David J.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 8
Number 1 Fall 1984 Article 1
1-1-1984
Antitrust Law and Economic Analysis: The
Swedish Approach
David J. Gerber
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David J. Gerber, Antitrust Law and Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach, 8 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol8/iss1/1
Antitrust Law and Economic Analysis:
The Swedish Approach
By DAVID J. GERBER
B.A., Trinity College, 1967 M.A., Yale University, 1969; J.R., University of
Chicago, 1972; Associate Professor, liT/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. INTRODUCION
Antitrust regimes are mixtures of law, economics and administrative
action. Such mixtures are intended to implement basic policy decisions
favoring competition and thus can be viewed as separate normative sys-
tems. Antitrust law systems have unique characteristics because they are
instituted to protect complex economic processes rather than individuals
or the state.'
The issues facing antitrust systems are similar in different countries.
The potential value of comparative analysis in the area of antitrust law
has, however, rarely been exploited. Lawyers and legal scholars tend to
view competition laws solely-within the context of a particular system
without utilizing the perspective derived from a comparative analysis.2
The tendency to look at antitrust solely from a national perspective has
been particularly pronounced in the United States.3
The need for comparative perspectives in antitrust law has become
especially critical in the United States where there is widespread confu-
1. The term "antitrust law" is used here to describe laws designed specifically to provide
sanctions against anticompetitive conduct. It is used because of its familiarity and conven-
ience. Terms widely used in other countries are likely to appear misleading, clumsy or unclear
to United States readers, eg. "cartel law" (Germany), "competition law" (France), and "re-
straint of competition law" (Sweden). For a description of all of the major competition law
systems, see WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (J. van Kalinowski ed. 1983).
2. There have been, of course, notable exceptions. See, eg., C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF
CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES (1967) and TRADE REGULATION OVERSEAS: THE NATIONAL
LAWS (1966); see also R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE (1967) and MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO THE CON-
TROL OF ECONOMIC POWER (1970).
3. In the United States, antitrust law is considered natural, even constitutional, in signifi-
cance. Yet many foreign nations view the United States antitrust system as being a "radical"
solution to the problem of protecting competition. See, eg., U. AF TROLLE, STUDIER I
KoNKuaNsFILOsOri OCH KONKURRENSLAGSTIFrNING 19 (1963).
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sion and doubt about antitrust law, its goals, values, structures and
processes and even the reason for the law's existence.' Recent criticism
of United States antitrust law has, however, tended to lack depth because
of the lack of comparative perspectives.5 Comparative study is also criti-
cal for the practicing attorney due to the increasing number of countries
with antitrust systems and the increasing severity of their respective laws.
From a comparative perspective the Swedish antitrust system is of
particular interest.6 Sweden utilizes antitrust law to achieve the same
basic goals that are pursued under United States antitrust law, but it does
so in a significantly different manner. In particular, Sweden has a vastly
different conception of the respective roles of law and economics in the
antitrust context. A comparison of the two systems thus highlights as-
pects of the United States system which otherwise tend to escape notice.
The economic context of Swedish antitrust law is also significant in
this regard. Sweden's economy is largely in private control, and the
Swedish government has generally avoided interference with market
mechanisms.7 The Swedish economy is also highly industrialized and
dependent upon its international competitive strength for its continued
well-being.' As a result, the Swedish antitrust system is designed to fos-
ter international competitiveness. 9 In the United States the need for in-
ternational competitiveness has only recently been perceived and this
perception has sharpened the controversy relating to United States anti-
trust laws.10
The objectives of this Article are threefold. The first is to describe
and analyze the Swedish antitrust law system. The second is to view this
system from a comparative perspective which will contribute to im-
4. Central works in the current controversy include R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA.
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1977) and R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECriVE (1976); see also Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. Rnv. 1140 (1981); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1051 (1979); and Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some
Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1980).
5. The one foreign antitrust law system which has been the subject of substantial com-
parative study in the United States is the cartel law of the European Economic Community.
See, eg., B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
(1979).
6. The most thorough recent description in English is Nerep, Sweden, in 7 WORLD LAW
OF COMPETITION (J. van Kalinowski ed. 1983).
7. The ownership and control of the Swedish economy are reviewed periodically by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.). See, e.g., O.E.C.D.,
SWEDEN (1982).
8. A. LINDBECK, SVENSK EKONOMISK POLTIK 40 (1970).
9. See infra text accompanying note 18.
10. See Fox, supra note 4, at 1143.
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proved understanding of the phenomenon of antitrust law. The third is
to provide insight into the controversy in the United States and elsewhere
about the goals, values and methods of antitrust law. The framework of
analysis centers on the concept of an "antitrust system," an approach
which provides a basis for understanding and evaluating the complex in-
terrelationships between legal, administrative and economic factors in a
government's efforts to protect competition.
There is a great deal of controversy in the United States about anti-
trust law, but most participants in the controversy would probably agree
that United States antitrust law should be analytically clearer, less re-
strictive of economic development and less costly. In each of these areas
a review of the Swedish experience with antitrust law provides valuable
insights.
IL. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWEDISH ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION
The basic stucture of Swedish antitrust law was created by the en-
actment of the Law Against Restraints of Competition (LRC) in 1953.11
This statute was the first antitrust law in Swedish history and, although
segments of it have been modified, the basic structure of the 1953 Act
remains unchanged.
A. The 1953 Law Against Restraints of Competition
1. Background
Sweden first seriously considered the enactment of legal measures to
control anticompetitive practices after the end of World War 11.12 The
measures were directly related to economic developments resulting from
the war. Although Sweden was a neutral country, the war drastically
affected its economy. 13 Wartime shortages and economic disruptions
forced the government to control virtually the entire economy. In most
branches of the economy enterprises were forced to join government-reg-
ulated cartels. Additionally, most goods and services were rationed, and
11. Lag den 25 September 1953 om motverkande i vissa fall av Konkurrensbegrinning
inom N~ringslivet, Svensk Forfattnings Samling (SF) 1953:603.
12. For a brief review of the prewar developments, see Wetter, Swedish Antitrust Law, 10
AM. J. CoMP. L. 19 (1961).
13. A factor which made Sweden's situation almost unique in Europe was the uneven
impact of World War H. Because Sweden supplied both sides with certain types of industrial
products, those portions of industry which produced such goods often operated at full capacity
and some reaped significant profits.
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there were strict price controls. 14
The situation that prevailed during the immediate postwar period
was not conducive to reducing these anticompetitive forces.15 Consumer
goods remained subject to severe shortages and, in many cases, price con-
trols. Moreover, because of the destruction of much of European indus-
try, many branches of Swedish industry were not subjected to serious
foreign competition for many years. Existing cartels sold all they pro-
duced and were shielded from the competitive market forces which
would have tended to weaken them and to limit their profitability. In
addition, the reduced effect of market forces supported the continued
existence of other anticompetitive practices and arrangements.
These circumstances gave organized groups of competitors the
power to keep prices above competitive levels. Only the existence of price
controls restricted the use of this power. In addition, these circum-
stances tended to create industrial structures which were unresponsive to
technological and economic pressures. Such structures threatened to un-
dermine the long run effectiveness of Swedish industry and its ability to
compete with rebuilt European industry. 16
The Swedish government thus faced a situation similar to that of
many other European countries whose economies had been subjected to
the anticompetitive distortions of both the 1930's and World War 11.17
In attempting to restore a market economy, the government focused on
two main economic policy goals: the reduction of inflationary pressures
and the improvement of economic efficiency.18
It was in furtherance of these goals that the government decided to
seek procompetition legislation. According to one commentator, "it was
deemed advisable to have hard competition which would not only ex-
clude forms of economic activity and companies which were less profita-
ble, but would also result in a rapid redistribution of resources to where
they could be expected to be most effective."1 9 The introduction of
procompetition legislation was part of the government's general eco-
nomic policy.20 The impetus for the procompetition legislation was a
strategic governmental decision based on considerations of economic
welfare. It was not supported, as was the introduction of antitrust law to
14. U. BER~rrz, MARKNADsRTr 160 (1969).
15. See generally A. LINDBECK, supra note 8, at ch. 2.
16. See Sandberg, Antitrust Policy in Sweden, 9 ANTrTRusT BULL. 535, 538-40 (1964).
17. See Thorelli, Antitrust in Europe: National Policies After 1945, 26 U. CHI. L. R V.
222 (1959).
18. See A. LINDBECK, supra note 8, at 40.
19. U. BERNrrz, supra note 14, at 161.
20. U. BERNrrz, KONKURRENS OCH PRISER I NoRDEN ch. 4 (1971).
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the United States, by a hotly debated, populist political movement di-
rected against specific types of big business activity. The considerations
behind the Swedish legislation were almost solely those of national eco-
nomic policy.21
In creating a legal regime to protect competition, the Swedish gov-
ernment was influenced by its own legal tradition and political situation
as well as by the experience of other states with procompetition laws.
The Swedish government borrowed ideas from other antitrust systems,
but created a unique system for Sweden. The decision to enact an anti-
trust law represented a significant departure from previous policy. 2
Swedish law had traditionally been unconcerned with competition-re-
lated issues. Unlike some other European countries, Sweden had failed
to develop contract law principles limiting the validity of anticompetitive
agreements and had steadfastly held to the principle of freedom of
contract.
When Sweden examined the experiences of other states with anti-
trust laws, it found no models which were sufficiently appealing to either
adopt or follow.' The United States was seen as the home of antitrust
law, and its experience was carefully studied, but the United States model
was not considered appropriate to Swedish circumstances. The Swedish
government considered it unthinkable, for example, to even consider
criminalizing behavior which had always been considered legal.24 More-
over, the experience of other European states with competition laws was
more limited and did not provide a basis for judging their effectiveness.
Nevertheless, Sweden was clearly influenced by the solutions which were
being devised in other countries during the postwar period.' It was
against this background that the LRC was enacted.
2. Goals and Basic Principles of the LRC
As part of a general package of economic policy measures intended
to reorient and deregulate the postwar Swedish economy, the LRC was
designed to affirmatively use competitive processes to attain fairly specific
economic goals.26 Whereas in the United States the Sherman Act2 7 was
aimed at combating specific existing business practices, the aim of the
21. See L. WEIN, EKONOMIC OCH RATfsYsmM 333-36 (1982).
22. See Sandberg, supra note 16, at 543-44.
23. See generally Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) 1951"27 at 483.
24. S. HOLMBERG, MOT MONOPOLISERING? NO's VERKsmHET UNDER 25 AR 27-30
(1981).
25. See AF TROLLE, supra note 3, at 21-37.
26. A. MARTENIUs, LAGSTIFrNING OM KONKURRENSBEROR.NSNINO 26 (1965).
27. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (original version at 26 Stat. 209 (1890)).
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LRC was to promote competition as an economic policy tool. Promoting
competition was intended to reduce inflationary pressures and to main-
tain an internationally competitive industrial structure. The two goals
overlap but have been viewed separately.
The most immediate goal of the new statute was to create a mecha-
nism to combat inflationary pressures. Competition in the marketplace
was to act as a price regulator.28 Curiously, therefore, Swedish antitrust
law was created as part of a package of measures which included strin-
gent price controls. Although ideologically inconsistent, both served the
same goal-limiting price increases.
The issue of how competition would combat inflation was addressed
by focusing on the reduction of costs, particularly distribution costs, in
accordance with the dominant economic theories of the day.2 9 Swedish
economic policy makers placed strong emphasis on rationalizing indus-
trial structures and distribution channels. This cost reduction emphasis
has left its imprint on Swedish antitrust law. The goal of reducing costs
permeates the legislative history and, therefore, the case law.30
The statute was designed to promote "effective competition," i.e.,
competition which would reduce costs to the consuiner and which would
make Swedish goods more competitive internationally. The concern was
not with restraints of competition per se, but rather with their economic
effects. As stated by the commerce minister on presentation of a revision
of the LRC to Parliament in 1956:
[The effort to control competition] does not aim at the free competition
of the classical economic model but rather at the competition which is
from society's standpoint the most effective competition, i.e., a compe-
tition which directs development in that direction which in the long
run can be expected to involve the best utilization of the society's re-
sources. Certain limitations on competition are without question not
only acceptable but valuable and actually necessary from the stand-
point of society.31
Swedish antitrust law is highly pragmatic.32 Competitive processes
are not seen as good in and of themselves, but rather as means to particu-
lar economic and social ends. Consequently, the law tends to be less
abstract, and its approach less absolute, than United States antitrust law.
The political values which United States antitrust law has generally been
28. A. MARTENIUS, supra note 26, at 27.
29. See generally id. at 28; LINDBECK, supra note 8, at 40.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
31. Proposition (Prop) 1956:148 at 41, cited with approval in Prop. 1981/82:165, at 43.
32. U. BERNITZ, supra note 20, at 98-101.
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considered to protect play little, if any, role in Swedish antitrust law. In
part this is a reflection of the fact that Sweden has been ruled by the
Social Democratic Party since the mid-1930's (with the exception of
1976-82). 3" The Social Democratic Party has used the market system to
provide the economic well-being necessary to support its social welfare
goals. On the ideological level, however, the Social Democrats have been
forced to reject the notion of competition as a goal in and of itself.
3. The Scheme of the Legislation
The legislative scheme created in 1953 forbids two narrowly defined
restraints of competition and authorizes governmental action to elimi-
nate others where the restraints have certain effects. The prohibited re-
straints are collusive bidding and resale price maintenance. Violations
are prosecuted in the regular courts and violators are subject to criminal
penalties. Other restraints are subject to governmental intervention only
where the effects are "contrary to the public interest." In the 1953 legis-
lation, only cartels and monopolies were subject to this so-called "general
clause.",34
The statute also created a new government agency called "The Of-
fice of the Competition Ombudsman" to enforce the LRC. 5 In cases
involving prohibited restraints, this office was to recommend prosecution
in the regular courts. With respect to other violations, the ombudsman
was to attempt to negotiate with potential violators and, if unsuccessful
in eliminating the restraint, to prosecute the case in a newly formed court
whose sole function was to hear such cases. From the beginning, there-
fore, the law and the process of applying it were conceived as a separate
legal subsystem. By 1956 the government believed that the antitrust sys-
tem was capable of standing alone in the fight against inflation, and it
therefore eliminated most price controls. At the same time the general
clause of the LRC was expanded to apply to all restraints of competition
other than those specifically prohibited under this Act.36
B. The Competition Act of 1982: Mergers, Enforcement and
Modernization
For nearly two decades the system created by the LRC worked well,
33. See generally S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, ch. 3.
34. In generally refusing to criminalize anticompetitive behavior, the Swedish government
was following the lead of other European countries. See Thorelli, supra note 17, at 220-33.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 80-90.
36. Lag angaende 5ndring i lagen av den 25 September 1953 (No. 603) om motverkande i
vissa fall av Konkurrensbegransning inom Nrifngslivet (SFS 1956:244).
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and there was little serious dissatisfaction with it. In the early 1970's,
however, serious attention was focused on rapid increases in the concen-
tration of Swedish industry and the potential negative effects of such con-
centration. 7 The government responded to this concern by establishing
several commissions to study concentration and its effects. One of these
commissions was directed to review the overall effectiveness of the LRC
in light of general economic trends and, in particular, to review the possi-
bility of applying the LRC to mergers and acquisitions.3" This commis-
sion, appointed in 1974, released a book length report in 1978 which
recommended no changes in the basic structure of Swedish antitrust
law.39 It did, however, make three major recommendations: (1) that sev-
eral types of anticompetitive practices be forbidden; (2) that new rules be
introduced to deal specifically with mergers and acquisitions; and (3) that
the sanctions available to both the competition ombudsman and the mar-
ket court for enforcing the statute be strengthened.
The report of the commission created substantial controversy in
both government and industry,4" with the industrial sector strongly op-
posed to many of the recommended changes. It was against this back-
ground that the Competition Act of 198241 was passed. Although the
substantive provisions of this new statute are generally identical to those
of the LRC, some of the statutory language was "modernized" to clarify
the old statute. Moreover, new provisions were included to cover acqui-
sitions and mergers.42 The changes reflected governmental recognition
of the fact that the conceptual framework of the LRC was inadequate to
regulate mergers. The most far reaching changes, however, may well
have been those which dealt with the process of application of the law.43
The new act gives the market court and the competition ombudsman the
power to impose significant new sanctions to support their respective
functions.'
37. See S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 46-48.
38. See Prop. 1981/82:165, supra note 31, at 10-11.
39. See Statens Offentuga Utredningar (SOU) 1978:9. For a discussion of the role of the
SOU, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
40. For a summary of the various positions, see Prop. 1981/82:165, at 329-554.
41. Konkurrenslagen (SFS 1982:729). For a translation, see Nerep, supra note 6,
appendix.
42. See generally L. HARDING, KONTROLL AV FbRETAGSFORVARV I SVERIGI 10-12
(1983).
43. For a review of these changes, see Sandstrom, Den Nya Konkurrenslagen, I PRIs ocIt
KONKURRENS 5 (1983).
44. See infra text accompanying note 92.
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF SWEDISH ANTITRUST LAW
From its inception Swedish antitrust law has divided anticompeti-
five activities into two categories: those which are forbidden (i e., resale
price maintenance and collusive bidding) and those whose effects must be
evaluated under the terms of the so-called "general clause." These two
categories are conceptually and procedurally distinct.
A. The General Clause-The Basic System of Swedish Antitrust Law
Except for resale price maintenance and collusive bidding, all poten-
tially anticompetitive conduct is judged under the statute's general
clause. This clause therefore provides the conceptual structure of Swed-
ish antitrust law. According to this provision:
If a restraint of competition has a harmful effect within the country,
the market court may, in accordance with this statute, adopt measures
to prevent such an effect...
A harmful effect shall occur where, in a manner which is contrary to
the public interest, the restraint of competition
(1) unduly affects the formation of prices,
(2) impairs efficiency in business, or
(3) hinders or prevents the business activities of another. 45
The statute poses three questions: 1) Does the conduct constitute a "re-
straint of competition"? 2) is there a "harmful effect" on society? and 3)
is the effect "contrary to the public interest"?
1. Restraint of Competition
The first step in applying the general clause is to determine whether
there is a restraint of competition. This concept was intended to encom-
pass "every condition which ...has as its result that competition is not
completely free and unrestrained."" How the restraint of competition
came into being is irrelevant, as is the intent of the parties. "Restraint of
competition," which is not defined in the statute, is so broadly construed
that virtually any restriction on the freedom of economic activity falls
within the clause.47 The abuse of a market-dominating position, for ex-
ample, constitutes a restraint of competition under the statute,48 as does
45. SFS 1982:729, § 2 (formerly SFS 1953:603, § 5).
46. A. MARTENIus, supra note 26, at 43.
47. See generally SOU 1978:9, at 94.
48. See Lidgard, Missbruk av Marknadsdominerande StIlining och Mjligheterna till Fu-
sionskontroll enligt Svensk Rdtt, 42 TIDSKRIFT FOR SVERIGES ADVOKATSA MFUNDET 333
(1981); Otteryd, Missbruk av Marknadsdominerande Stdllning, id. at 242.
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an anticompetitive merger or acquisition.49 Because the term is so
broadly construed, it plays a relatively minor role in analyzing a poten-
tial antitrust violation.
The minor role played by the concept of restraint reflects the "ef-
fects" orientation of the statute. Restraints of competition are not neces-
sarily seen as negative; their legal status depends solely on their effects.
It also reflects recognition of the fact that defining the concept of re-
straint of competition in operative terms is difficult, if not impossible.50
2. The "Harmful Effects" Criteria
Given the broad definition of the concept of restraint of competition,
the main issue to be decided in applying the statute is whether the re-
straint causes "harmful effects" within the contemplation of the statute.
Fortunately, the statute includes criteria for determining whether such
harmful effects are present. A restraint is a violation only if it meets one
of the three so-called "effects criteria." It must either affect the setting
of prices, impair efficiency, or hinder or prevent another's business
activities.
a. The Price Criterion
The LRC was conceived primarily as a price regulating statute. Ac-
cordingly, the first of the effects criteria finds harm where a restraint
affects prices. The price criterion has been the most important criterion,
as was intended. The concept is not, however, as broad as it appears, nor
is its method of application self-evident. It is essentially an antiinflation-
ary measure. Consequently, the provision has been interpreted to refer
not to every effect on prices, but only to "every effect on price level which
tends to increase or maintain prices."51 Moreover, this provision is not
only applicable to cases in which an actual upward effect on prices can be
shown, it is also applicable to cases in which a substantial risk of such an
effect is shown.52
The basic method of determining whether the criterion has been met
is the application of price theory analysis.53 This analysis determines the
likelihood that the practice has led, or will lead, to upward pressure on
prices. The purpose of the analysis is not to determine the nature of the
restraint for purposes of categorization, as is the case in the United
49. See L. HARDING, KONTROLL Av F6RETAGSSAMMANSLUTN1NGAR ch. 9 (1982).
50. SOU 1951:27, at 517.
51. A. MARTENIUS, supra note 26, at 102.
52. U. BERNITZ, SVENSK MARKNADSRATT 58-59 (1983).
53. Id. at 50.
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States, but rather to determine whether in a particular situation the re-
straint has led to price increases or can reasonably be expected to do so.
Although cartels inherently tend to increase prices, for example, a spe-
cific cartel in a particular situation may not have such a price-increasing
effect.54 Swedish antitrust law looks to the overall situation and asks
whether the requisite effect exists.
In addition to economic theory, however, price/cost comparisons
may also be used in applying the price criterion.55 Where prices in a
particular market appear high in relation to costs, the law countenances
the application of price/cost comparisons which may indicate that the
restraint tends to increase prices.
b. The Efficiency Criterion
The second harmful effects criterion includes restraints on competi-
tion which impair efficiency in business. This criterion is closely related
to the price criterion because a reduction in efficiency generally involves
an eventual increase in prices. It was included as a separate criterion in
the statute in order to emphasize the importance of efficiency and to ad-
dress situations in which a restraint of competition reduced efficiency
without, at least in the short run, affecting prices.56
As used in the Swedish antitrust law, "efficiency" does not refer to
the economic efficiency of the neoclassical model. This concept of effi-
ciency was specifically rejected as being an inadequate measure of the
social harm resulting from restraints on competition. According to the
drafters of the legislative proposal,
to the extent a restraint of competition is, on balance, harmful from the
standpoint of society, it is not clear that the harm rests with the fact
that it negatively affects economic distribution---a, that [monopoly
power] improperly secures profits at the expense of consumers. This
can certainly occur, but it seems likely that even more often the harm-
ful effects result from the fact that the restraint of competition in vari-
ous ways impedes rationalization or contributes to waste of
resources.
57
The concept of efficiency was thus defined in reference not to a theoreti-
cal model, but rather in reference to the process of economic
development.
The efficiency concept focuses on incentives to actual and potential
54. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
55. SOU 1978:9, at 96.
56. A. MARTENiUS, supra note 26, at 103.
57. SOU 1951:27, at 59.
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market participants to reduce costs, compete "on the merits" and de-
velop new or improved methods of production and/or distribution. Ac-
cording to the official explanation of the LRC, a restraint on competition
impedes efficiency where it hinders technological or organizational pro-
gress or generally reduces competitive incentives. This includes situa-
tions where, for example, inefficient companies are given artificial
protection by contract, or where prices in a cartel are set to protect the
least efficient producer.5"
A restraint is thus inefficient where it interferes with the process of
economic development by reducing incentives for firms to improve their
economic performances. The establishment of a cartel, for example, will
generally have this effect because it eliminates incentives for cartel mem-
bers to compete. Vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance
may have this effect by reducing pressures on distributors to develop less
costly means of distribution.59 This concept of efficiency is less theoreti-
cally precise than that of microeconomic price theory. By focusing on
obstacles to economic development, however, it relates the impact of an-
titrust law to both consumer price levels and the international competi-
tiveness of the Swedish economy. The relationship between the efficiency
concept and the issue of international competitiveness also establishes a
broad base of political support, for international competitiveness is of
paramount concern to both consumers and producers in Sweden.
c. Impeding Another's Business Activities
According to the third criterion, harmful effects occur when a re-
straint of competition "hinders or prevents" the business activities of an-
other. On its face this criterion does not fit easily with the other two, for
it appears to be aimed at protecting the individual enterprise rather than
society as a whole. Protecting the individual enterprise from the effects
of such conduct is, however, seen as a benefit to society in general and to
consumers in particular.'
According to the official explanation of the LRC,
If a restraint of competition impedes new business from entry or re-
stricts already existing companies in their development, this must in
the long run tend to maintain existing business structures and hinder
the development of new, more effective forms of enterprise. In the
58. Prop. 1953:103, at 118.
59. For further discussion of the treatment of resale price maintenance under Swedish law
see infra text accompanying notes 108-115.
60. A. MARTENIUS, supra note 26, at 104-6.
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long run this can lead to inflexibility in business.61
Where an enterprise is prevented from competing in the market alto-
gether, or is prevented from operating on the same terms as other compa-
nies, long run efficiency and competitiveness are likely to suffer. The
official explanation cites examples of restraints likely to have the prohib-
ited effect: group boycotts, exclusive dealing among a group of buyers
and/or sellers and discrimination in prices or other terms by a market-
dominating enterprise.62 Each of these practices is likely to lead to that
rigidity in market structures which the statute is designed to combat.
The main themes of the three effect criteria are cost reduction, mo-
bility of resources and economic development. The objectives are long-
term effectiveness and international competitiveness. Sweden's well-be-
ing has been based on its international competitiveness for many years,
and its antitrust laws are designed to maintain and improve that competi-
tiveness by eliminating restraints of competition which prevent its
development.
The harmful effects criteria refer to the existence of particular ef-
fects. They do not, however, determine the intensity of the required ef-
fects. Whether a particular effect on prices or a particular hindrance to
competition is enough to constitute a violation is determined by applica-
tion of the final basic component of the statutory structure.
3. The Public Interest Criterion
The third component of the test of legality under the general clause
is the public interest criterion. In order for a restraint of competition to
violate the statute, it must not only meet one or more of the harmful
effects criteria, but it also must do so in a manner which is "contrary to
the public interest."63 This part of the test makes it clear that state inter-
vention is authorized only where a restraint of competition would be det-
rimental to society as a whole." "Harmful effects" are not sufficient in
and of themselves to justify such intervention. Intervention is only to
occur where, on balance, the designated harmful economic effects of the
restraint are not substantially outweighed by other economic or social
benefits which may result from the restraint
61. Prop. 1953:103, at 119.
62. See Id.
63. The Swedish term is "pa ett ur allminn synpunkt otillbarligt sitt." Translated more
literally, it reads "in a manner which is improper from the standpoint of society in general." It
is, however, clearly intended to represent a public interest standard. See& g., SOU 1978:9, at
98.
64. See U. BEawrrz, supra note 52, at 58.
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The government's explanation of this criterion, expressed in con-
junction with extension of the LRC in 1956, recognized that this provi-
sion allowed a "certain amount of room for subjective evaluation." 65
The government argued, however, that in the overwhelming majority of
cases application of the concept of societal harm would not present a
significant problem. The government stated, for example, that it "was
obvious that societal harm will not be considered to exist where the im-
perfections in competition are a direct result of natural scarcity of re-
sources, legislation or governmental controls. 66
This provision therefore serves two functions: 67 First, it eliminates
state interference in cases of limited importance, allowing intervention
only in cases of "general interest." A particular restraint may be of gen-
eral interest either because of the magnitude of the economic effects in-
volved or the precedential value of the case in deterring future restraints.
Second, the provision is intended to take into account public interests
other than the harmful effects specified in the statute. The drafters em-
phasized that there might be other interests of society which were more
important in a particular situation than those specific economic effects
represented by the harmful effects criteria. They therefore required that
there be a balancing of interests. Only when the specified harmful effects
are not outweighed by other societal benefits-economic or otherwise-is
governmental intervention allowed.
Long run structural economic factors play an important role in this
context.68 The act is not to be applied, for example, to arrangements
whereby small producers cooperate with each other in order to compete
more effectively with larger producers. Other factors which have been
found important in this context include the potential effects of anticom-
petitive arrangements on the availability of medical equipment 69 and on
employment in a regional labor market.70
B. Prohibited Conduct: The Per Se Rules
The "general clause" does not apply to resale price maintenance and
collusive bidding; these restraints are per se illegal. They were consid-
ered so serious that they were dealt with more harshly than other types
65. Prop. 1956:48, at 39.
66. Id.
67. See generally Prop. 1981/82:165, at 50-51.
68. See, eg., A. MARTENIUS, supra note 26, at 97; Prop. 1981/82:165, at 31.
69. N.O. v. AB Gambro, Marknadsdomstolens Avg6randen 1976-77 89,112 (No.
1976:10).
70. See, ag., Prop. 1981/82:165, at 51.
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of restraints.71 Accordingly, in addition to being per se illegal, these pro-
hibited practices are subject to separate procedural provisions. They are
treated as ordinary criminal violations and are prosecuted in the regular
courts by the public prosecutor (although the competition ombudsman in
such cases must first recommend prosecution).
The method of analysis in such cases is one of characterization-
does the conduct fit within the terms of the statute? If yes, there is a per
se violation. The economic and social analysis called for under the gen-
eral clause does not apply to these situations. The market court may
grant special permission to violate either of these provisions, but it has
seldom done so.
IV. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
Swedish antitrust law is applied pursuant to a particular legal pro-
cess and can be understood only in relation to that process. In Sweden
competition law is not subject to the general rules and processes of the
legal system. Instead, it is recognized and treated as a distinct subsystem
within the Swedish legal system.72
This recognition of the special character of antitrust law is related to
the historical circumstances under which antitrust law was introduced
into the legal system. Due to the lack of prior legal sanctions against
anticompetitive behavior, the LRC was not seen as part of a continuum
but rather as a sharp break with existing legal practices. 71 Conse-
quently, the drafters were unwilling to criminalize violations and thereby
subject violators to the processes of the ordinary courts. In this respect
the situation was fundamentally different from that surrounding the crea-
tion of the antitrust laws in the United States, where antitrust law was
considered to be an extension of the common law on restraints of trade.
In Sweden, competition law ideas were new and different and there-
fore had to be handled very carefully. It was considered politically unac-
ceptable to penalize conduct which had always been protected by the
principle of freedom of contract. In particular, the business community
vigorously opposed criminalization.74 Therefore, in order for the govern-
ment to secure the cooperation of the Swedish business community, anti-
trust law had to be enforced by means other than criminal sanctions.
71. For a more detailed discussion of the area, see Nerep, supra note 6, at §§ 3.01(3Xa),
3.01(3)(b).
72. For a more detailed discussion see Nerep, supra note 6, cl. 4.
73. See, eg., U. BERNrrz, supra note 14, at 421-22.
74. See S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 27-31.
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This required creating a legal subsystem based on a specialized con-
ception of law. Under this subsystem, private rights of action are very
limited. A government agency is primarily responsible for the applica-
tion and development of antitrust principles. Moreover, adjudication of
antitrust cases is in the hands of a specialized court rather than the ordi-
nary courts.
The Swedish antitrust process is built upon the principle of negotia-
tion, which is in turn based on the belief that publicity and public pres-
sure will generally serve as sufficient enforcement mechanisms.75 The
theory has been that enterprises will comply with the law in order to
avoid the negative publicity which would result from legal proceedings.
This negotiation-based system is supported by a widely accepted belief
that such a system allows more flexibility and is more likely to achieve
compliance and secure the necessary cooperation of the business commu-
nity than would a system of prohibitions and penal sanctions.76
The effectiveness of this system depends on the relationship between
the process of applying the statute and the structure of the statute itself.
The drafters did not seek to fit new legal principles into an existing sys-
tem or to use a new process to apply rules developed in another proce-
dural context. The legal structure and the process of application were
created simultaneously as part of the same system and with the same
objectives. 77 This fact is central to an understanding of the Swedish sys-
tem. The relationship between the structure of the law and the process
created to apply it can best be understood by looking at the major institu-
tions responsible for applying these provisions.
A. The Role of Legislative Commissions
For major legislative measures the Swedish government generally
appoints an independent public commission to investigate a particular
problem and, often, to recommend legislation. These commissions are
generally composed of both experts in the relevant area and politicians.
There has traditionally been a significant effort to keep these commis-
sions nonpartisan.
75. See, eg., SOU 1951:27, at 492-7.
76. See S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 58.67.
77. "Application" refers to the process by which the law is used in the legal process.
United States usage would be likely to speak of "enforcement" of the law in referring to this
process. The term "apply" more accurately reflects, however, the statute-oriented approach to
the law which is common in civil-law countries (e.g., the German "Rechtsanwendung"), and it
is a literal translation of the Swedish term, "rittstill~impning," which is generally used in this
context in Sweden.
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A commission investigates the designated problem and issues a book
length report known as an "SOU"78 which generally contains an expert
analysis, a comparative survey of the treatment of the problem in other
selected countries, the commission's recommendations and, often, pro-
posed legislation. The SOU is then submitted to the government, which
generally holds hearings and asks for comments from interested parties.
The final step in the legislative process is for the government to decide on
a particular course of action, generally issuing a full report (the "legisla-
tive proposition") which summarizes the entire legislative procedure, in-
cluding the hearings and comments, and suggests recommendations for
legislation. Because of the authority of the legislative commissions, the
SOU's generally have a significant impact on the relevant legislative pro-
positions.7 9 Although political factors may force the government to
modify the recommendations of the commission or abandon them alto-
gether, the commission's analysis of the problems discussed is often
treated as authoritative.
Legislative commissions have played a major role in the develop-
ment and application of Swedish antitrust law. A legislative commission
drafted the LRC, and most of the changes brought about by the Compe-
tition Act of 1982 were analyzed and recommended by a subsequent leg-
islative commission. The SOU's written by these commissions thus
contain extensive material describing the problems perceived by them
and the ways in which particular legislative proposals were intended to
apply to these problems. The importance of these commissions lies pri-
marily in the fact that their findings are accorded great weight in deci-
sions of the competition ombudsman and the market court.
B. The Role of the Competition Ombudsman
The legislature placed primary responsibility for enforcement of the
antitrust laws on a newly established governmental office called the Of-
fice of the Competition Ombudsman."0 The functions of this office have
78. "Statens offentliga utredningar," which means literally "the state's public
investigations."
79. See generally J. SUNDBERG, FRON EDDAN TO EKEL5F (1978), where it is suggested
that legislative commissions may have too much importance in the process of applying Swed-
ish statutes.
80. The Swedish term is "Niiringsfrihetsombudsman," which means literally
"ombudsman for business freedom." The term refers to both the individual who is the
ombudsman and the semi-independent government agency which that individual heads. The
office of the ombudsman was originally designed in Sweden in the eighteenth century in oder
to oversee the actions of state officials. See generally JHgersk6ld, The Swedish Ombudsman,
109 U. PA. L. Rav. 1077 (1961).
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not changed over the years, although the size of the office-as well as its
budget-have been increased.81
1. Composition of the Office of the Competition Ombudsman
The composition of this government office is of particular impor-
tance.8 2 The staff is quite small, consisting of less than fifty full-time staff
members. The ombudsman must be qualified to be a judge, but the stat-
ute establishes no other qualifications for officials in the office. In fact,
the office tends to have more economists than lawyers in leading posi-
tions. The predominance of economists in the ombudsman's office re-
flects a belief that antitrust law is supposed to avoid narrow legalism and
be administered in a practical and flexible manner. Antitrust law has not
been seen as law in the traditional sense, and the extensive use of econo-
mists in its administration reflects this fact.
The large number of economists in the Office of the Omsbudsman
affects the way in which the office functions. The opinions of the
ombudsman, for example, tend to avoid citation of precedent and gener-
ally minimize traditional civil law legal analysis. This is due in part to
the conceptual structure of the law, which focuses on the determination
of harmful effects rather than on their characterization.
The attendant flexibility of the Swedish approach is generally con-
sidered to be a positive attribute of the system. Flexibility, however, is
recognized as having negative consequences as well. A flexible approach
reduces consistency and inhibits the development of principles of con-
struction which a greater concern for precedent and legal analysis may be
expected to produce.
Another important factor in this context is the central role of negoti-
ation and informal pressure in securing compliance with the law. Busi-
ness economists are expected to be better at understanding business
problems and better at negotiating with businesspersons than lawyers
would be. Moreover, because of their educational and other ties to the
business community, such officials can be expected to maximize informal
compliance pressure.
2. The Investigation Function
The Office of the Ombudsman is the institutional center of the anti-
trust system. Legal proceedings must start there, and they generally end
there. Enforcement of the competition law is almost entirely in the
81. See S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 38-40.
82. For a description of the office and its activities, see Nerep, supra note 6, at § 4.01(2).
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hands of the ombudsman, and legal steps can generally be taken only by
the ombudsman. Technically, an aggrieved party may take his or her
case directly to the market court if the ombudsman refuses to do so, but
this has seldom been done.83 The antitrust system is thus a closed system
where access to enforcement of the law is through the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Many investigations by the office begin as a result of private com-
plaints, usually from injured parties." The office generally undertakes an
independent investigation of such complaints. If it believes that a viola-
tion is occurring, it will contact the offending companies in an effort to
end the practice.
The Office of the Ombudsman also commences investigations on the
basis of information from other formal and informal sources. A key
source is the Price and Cartel Office."5 This office is a separate govern-
mental unit comprised largely of economists which carries out, often in
conjunction with the Office of the Ombudsman, industry-wide investiga-
tions. The results of these industry-wide investigations often reveal an-
ticompetitive conduct and serve as the basis for action by the
ombudsman. The independence and high reputation of the Price and
Cartel Office make its reports important elements of evidence.
3. The Enforcement Function
The drafters of the LRC believed that the very fact that an investiga-
tion was conducted by the ombudsman's office would cause many firms
to eliminate anticompetitive conduct for fear of negative publicity. 8 6 If,
upon investigation, the ombudsman's office believes that conduct violates
the statute, it negotiates with the parties involved in order to persuade
them to abandon the practice. With few minor exceptions,87 the office
cannot itself order compliance with the statute, nor can it punish a firm
for improper conduct which has ceased. The office attempts to convince
83. The system discourages such action by allowing an individual to proceed to the mar-
ket court only where the competition ombudsman has found that the action complained of
does not constitute a violation and by not providing damages to an injured party.
84. Statistics covering the activities of the competition ombudsman are published annu-
ally in Pris och Konkurrens. For a statistical description of the investigative function of the
ombudsman's office, see S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at ch. 6.
85. See generally U. BERNrrz, supra note 52, at 60-61.
86. See SOU 1951:27, at 17.
87. The most significant exception is found in section 11 of the Competition Law of 1982.
It had no counterpart in the LRC. According to section 11, the competition ombudsman may,
in cases "which are not of major importance," order enterprises to take or refrain from taking
specified actions.
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the parties that it is correct in its analysis, that it would be likely to
succeed at the market court and that the publicity arising from formal
action at that level would be adverse. In a large proportion of the cases
this process leads to abandonment of the practice at issue.88
An enforcement system based largely on persuasive rather than
compulsory mechanisms presupposes strong cultural and societal respect
for administrative agencies. Its success also requires a high level of busi-
ness ethics and a strong sense of cooperation within the business commu-
nity. These conditions are, to a large extent, present in Sweden, and
consequently compliance with the statute is generally good. 9
Only where the ombudsman's informal compliance efforts are un-
successful is the case taken to the market court, where the ombudsman
serves as prosecutor in the formal court proceedings. It is not unusual,
however, for defendants to agree to end the practices involved after the
case has been submitted to the market court. If this is done, the
ombudsman must withdraw his complaint. For a variety of reasons, in-
cluding limited financial resources, the ombudsman generally tries to
avoid going to the market court except in particularly strategic cases.
This reluctance may have been increased by the market court's general
tendency during the 1970's to establish high requirements of proof. As a
result, very few cases are heard by the market court each year.90
In addition to carrying out these official functions, the ombudsman's
office is also in constant contact with the business community, explaining
its position with respect to various types of practices and informally
working to assure compliance with the law. This informal procedure is
seen as being of great importance to the success of the ombudsman's
efforts.
4. The Law Development Function
Because most violations are eliminated at the level of the
ombudsman, the office also plays a central role in the development of
antitrust law. Much of the law in the area is, in effect, made by that
office, which handles some four to five hundred cases per year, publishing
written opinions in many of them.
A written opinion of the ombudsman is not legally binding on the
office in future decisions and has no authoritative weight for the market
88. See, eg., NO - Verksamheten 1982 (Annual Report of the Competition Ombudsman
for 1982), 2 PRis OCH KONKURRENS 48, 66 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Annual Report 1982).
89. See, e-g., Wetter, supra note 12, at 48; S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 167,
90. For statistics, see Annual Report 1982, supra note 88, at 66. In recent years there
have been, on the average, about five cases per year.
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court. This now extensive body of decisions is important, however, for
two main reasons. First, the Office of the Ombudsman considers itself
bound to strive for consistency in application of the law, and since the
ombudsman's office is the main enforcement institution, its previous
opinions provide the best guide to its likely future actions. Second, the
fact that there are few market court decisions means that in many cases
the ombudsman's opinions represent the only authoritative interpretation
of the statute.
The Office of the Ombudsman considers itself bound by decisions of
the market court, and it appears to follow the authority of those deci-
sions. Nevertheless, it seldom cites market court opinions. It generally
refers for authoritative guidance only to the legislative history, in part,
one suspects, because the economists on the staff are opposed to too
much legalism.
C. The Role of the Market Court
The third central institution of the Swedish antitrust system is the
market court.91 It is composed of a president and a vice-president, both
of whom must be qualified to be judges in the regular court system. The
other members of the court generally are not lawyers. Among these
other members there must be at least three "experts" (in competition
cases two of them must be professional economists) as well as three con-
sumer and labor representatives and three representatives of industry.
The market court has two main functions. First, it determines
through trial proceedings whether there has been a violation of the stat-
ute. If it finds such a violation, it negotiates with the parties through
"negotiation proceedings" to eliminate the unlawful activity.
Proceedings before the court in the trial phase are formal and adver-
sarial, with the ombudsman acting as prosecutor. The rules of procedure
applicable to market court proceedings are, however, more flexible than
the rules applicable to proceedings before the ordinary courts. Upon
reaching a decision, the court issues an often lengthy written opinion
which in form is similar to the opinions of the regular courts.
If the court determines that there has been a violation, it proceeds to
the negotiation phase. At this phase the court, or in some cases its presi-
dent alone, meets with the parties and attempts to work out a solution to
the problem. Until the passage of the Competition Act, the court had
91. This court was originally responsible only for cases involving the LRC. In 1971 it was
reorganized and acquired jurisdiction over cases brought by the then newly created consumer
ombudsman. For a general description of the court, see U. BERNrrz, supra note 52, at 20-23.
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very limited power to force compliance with its decisions. Although the
court had generally secured compliance even without compulsory tools,
the legislature considered that the court's negotiating position would be
improved if it had more extensive sanctioning power. It therefore gave
the court important additional power to issue injunctions and levy
fines.92 In general, however, this power is used only where negotiations
have proved unsuccessful.
The market court is specifically charged with a law-creating role.
Its function is not only to resolve conflicts, but also to create precedent
which will give further definition to the law. Nevertheless, the court has
been hesitant to act too much like an ordinary court.93 For example, the
court generally does not cite either prior cases or scholarly commentaries
in its opinions, and it relies for authority almost exclusively on the legis-
lative history of the statute. The market court is thus left in a difficult
position, for it is supposed to fulfill the guidance-providing role of a court
and yet minimize the use of legal techniques in its operations.
These three institutions (the legislative commissions, the competi-
tion ombudsman and the market court) function together as part of a
cohesive process. All have well-developed roles which are intentionally
integrated and serve a common set of goals. Moreover, the law which
they apply is specifically designed for utilization by such institutions.
The legislative commissions provide authoritative guidelines for in-
terpretation of the statute and thus serve to clarify the law. The exist-
ence of these guidelines also reduces political and practical pressures on
the ombudsman and the market court in conjunction with the applica-
tion of the law.
The competition ombudsman is given virtually sole access to the
market court, thus allowing him to largely control the development of
the law and the implementation of enforcement policy. The
ombudsman's office has the legal competence to ensure that it functions
in a principled, quasi-judicial manner capable of developing consistency
and maintaining respect for the law. It also has the functional economic
competence to enable it to effectively interpret the economic processes
with which it must deal, carry out the required negotiations with the
business community and exert the informal enforcement pressure neces-
sary to ensure compliance without sacrificing the cooperative basis of the
system.
92. These powers are summarized in Nerep, supra note 6, at § 4.01(3)(b).
93. For comments of the former Chief Judge of the market court on this function, see
Westerlind, Tio Ars Praxis i Marknadsdomstolen - Erfarenheter och Vdrderingar, SVENSK
JURIST TIDNING 401 (1981).
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The market court is led by lawyers trained and qualified to be
judges, and therefore it is fully functional as a judicial institution. Other
judges are experts in economics and thus give the court the competence
to grasp and deal with the law's economic issues. Moreover, a third
group of judges represents the interests of the various social groups pri-
marily affected by the law. This third group of judges internalizes the
perspectives of the groups they represent and ensures that the statute is
applied in a manner which is consistent with the goals of society as a
whole.
Finally, the statute is structured so that the functions of these vari-
ous competences are specified and their relations defined. It contains
specific legal issues and specific economic issues, and the relationship be-
tween them is kept clear. The statute asks each institution questions
which the institution has the competence to understand and answer.
V. SWEDISH ANTITRUST LAW IN ACTION
The response of a legal system to a particular situation depends
upon the structure of the law being applied and the process by which it is
applied. This section reviews the ways in which the Swedish antitrust
system has dealt with specific types of anticompetitive conduct. The
practices discussed in this section are noteworthy because of their practi-
cal significance as well as because of what they reveal about the system.
The cases referred to are market court decisions, which are the only deci-
sions considered to have authoritative precedential value.
A. Horizontal Restraints
Agreements between competitors--especially cartel agreements-
were among the main targets of the LRC.94 They are not, however, con-
sidered per se illegal because it is believed that they can be justified under
certain circumstances. When the antitrust legislative commission recom-
mended in 1978 that they be forbidden, there was virtually no legislative
support for such a prohibition, and cartel arrangements therefore remain
subject to the general clause."
The competition ombudsman has attacked a large number of cartels
and succeeded in eliminating many of them. As a general rule, both the
ombudsman and the market court agree that such arrangements consti-
tute violations of the Swedish antitrust law. There have, however, been a
number of cases in which such agreements have been condoned. Two
94. See SOU 1951:17, at 520.
95. Prop. 1981/82:165, at 131-38.
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decisions of the market court illustrate the analysis of this issue under
Swedish law.
In Brukens Bag Systems96 six domestic companies agreed to estab-
lish a joint sales corporation which would sell all paper garbage bags
manufactured by them for sale in the domestic market. These six firms
had a combined market share of approximately seventy-five percent, with
the other twenty-five percent being held by another domestic company.
The arrangements between these six enterprises constituted a cartel
agreement in which production quotas were assigned and prices fixed by
the competitors through the sales agency.
The market court found that the arrangement constituted a restraint
of competition, but it held that none of the criteria for establishing harm-
ful effects had been met. The court agreed that under most circum-
stances this type of arrangement would have an upward effect on prices
and therefore would meet the price criterion. It found no evidence, how-
ever, that the arrangement had in fact increased prices. Its conclusion
was based on the observation that increases in the price of paper bags had
not been greater than price increases for the raw materials used.
The court then turned to the question of whether there was a sub-
stantial risk of such upward price pressure. It found that this was un-
likely because there was substantial competition from another
manufacturer of paper garbage bags as well as from manufacturers of
plastic bags and other types of trash removal systems. The court, look-
ing at the total economic situation, concluded that the existence of a sub-
stantial competitor and effective substitutes was sufficient to negate the
price effects which would otherwise result from the cartel agreement.
The court also found that these two factors prevented the arrange-
ment from meeting the efficiency criterion. It held that although the ar-
rangement would normally reduce incentives to increase efficiency and
reduce costs to consumers, the existence of a formidable competitor and
reasonable substitutes made such a result unlikely. The cartel would
continue to have sufficient incentive to improve efficiency and there
would be no harmful effects. According to the court:
The market court can conclude only that the existing situation created
sufficient incentive for defendant companies to hold the prices for its
trash bags as low as possible, which in turn should have a correspond-
ing effect on the desire to rationalize the enterprises. In such a situa-
tion the disadvantages which cooperation of this type bring with them
relative to the efficiency of the industry cannot be seen as having suffi-
96. N.O. v. Billeruds AB, Marknadsdomstolens Avgbranden 1976-77 467 (No. 1977:15),
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cient importance that the arrangement for that reason can be seen as
having a harmful effect.
9 7
Moreover, as the court pointed out, the arrangement itself produced sig-
nificant cost savings, primarily as a result of standardization and distri-
bution efficiencies.
The court also found that the third criterion-the prevention or hin-
dering of business activities of others-was not met because the nonpar-
ticipating competitor had actually prospered under the umbrella of the
cartel. Thus, the court held, the cartel could not have hindered outside
competitors.
The Brukens Bag System opinion exemplifies the pragmatic ap-
proach of the market court and of Swedish antitrust law in general. The
court accepted the general proposition that price-fixing cartels ordinarily
have harmful effects. The court carried its analysis one step further,
however, and asked whether under the specific circumstances of the case
such effects were to be found. The availability of substitute products and
the existence of a powerful competitor outside the cartel clearly limited
harmful effects. The court then noted that such a cartel may yield cost
savings to society through the creation of more rational production and
distribution methods. Since some cost savings resulted and there were no
specific harmful effects in this particular situation, the court did not con-
sider the cartel to be a violation of the statute.
Under United States antitrust law such a price-fixing cartel would
be considered a per se violation because it has the purpose of raising
prices and has an effect on the market relationships which determine
prices.9" A United States court would not consider the factors consid-
ered by the Swedish court. The United States approach looks at the na-
ture of the conduct in per se cases, whereas Swedish law looks at the total
effect of a restraint in a particular case.
Boras Wall Coverings,99 a recent case which has received much at-
tention, further exemplifies some of these issues. This case is one of the
first major cases decided by the market court under the leadership of its
new president, Lars Jonson. In this case, the competition ombudsman
attacked, inter alia, a horizontal agreement to divide markets. The de-
fendants were Boras Wall Coverings (Boras), a major manufacturer of
wall coverings, and T-Konsortiet, an association of wall covering retail-
ers which owned fifty percent of the shares of Boras. The remaining
97. Id. at 487.
98. See e.g., United States v. Soony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
99. N.O. v. Borastapeter AB (No. 1983:2) (stencil not yet published).
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stock in Boras was privately owned, and there was a stockholders agree-
ment which provided that this 50/50 relationship would be maintained.
Boras sold approximately ninety percent of its production to mem-
bers of T-Konsortiet. By far its most important product was a collection
of wall coverings called the Borosan Collection. T-Konsortiet's charter
provided that "a member of the consortium has no right to sell Borosan
to resellers outside of its territory in any area where there is another
consortium member." The court found that this arrangement possessed
"a nearly horizontal character" as a result of the ownership relationship
between T-Konsortiet and Boras, but it clearly indicated that even if the
arrangement had been viewed as vertical, the analysis would have been
essentially the same.
In addressing the legality of this market division, the court looked
for guidance to the legislative history of the LRC. According to the
court,
The bill contained, inter alia, a provision that socially harmful effects
would be presumed to result where cartels divided markets. This pre-
sumption was not introduced into the act, but in the legislative report
on the act it was asserted that cases of this type appeared particularly
likely to lead to harmful effects. 1o
The court further relied on the analysis of such conduct contained in
the 1978 legislative commission report, which stated that,
[market division] sometimes leads to indirect efficiency gains by virtue
of the fact that participants achieve sales stability or by virtue of reduc-
tions in distribution costs. For example, inflationary cross transporta-
tion costs can be avoided. Such occasionally-arising efficiency gains
cannot, however, be accorded great significance in considering a gen-
eral prohibition of such practices. Of clearly superior importance is
rather the elimination of competition for purchasers among the partici-
pants, at least where such market subdivisions include an entire mar-
ket or a substantial part thereof. As a result, they acquire a protection
which also protects inefficient enterprises and this in turn causes the
efficient enterprises to lose their incentives for maintaining a high level
of rationalization. Here there is the risk . . . that the business struc-
tures will become inefficient, at least in the long run. Such horizontal
market divisions are, as a result of this, generally associated with
harmful effects on economic efficiency. They can, therefore, also have
a price increasing effect. 101
100. Id. at 59.
101. SOU 1978:9, at 231, quoted in N.O. v. Borastapeter AB (No. 1983:2) at 60.
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Thus the economic analysis of the legislative commission created a
framework of analysis which the court specifically held to be controlling.
Defendants argued that these disadvantages were outweighed by the
fact that rational production at low prices was conditioned upon having
dependable sellers and that market division was necessary to make
Borosan sufficiently attractive to earn the loyalty of these sellers. They
argued that if this system were forbidden, rational production with low
costs "would be replaced by production under uncertain sales conditions
and where marketing would consume increased resources.""0
Notwithstanding defendants' argument that distribution costs
would be increased, the court focused on the reduction of intrabrand
competition. The court found that,
[such] competition has, as a result of the division of markets, been un-
able to develop where there has been only one reseller. Significant for
evaluation of market divisions is that they have prevented competition
between resellers in various areas and have thus had the effect of pre-
serving the existing competitive situation .... This means that the
industry's structure has been preserved and improvements in efficiency
have been prevented. . . . Construction companies and other large
buyers with nationwide activities, for example, cannot buy Borosan
through a central purchasing program, which is obviously not
rational. 103
The court then discussed other negative effects of the system and con-
cluded that the justifications presented for the system "cannot outweigh
the negative effects which have been established. These are therefore to
be seen as against the public interest." 1 4
This portion of the case provides an example of the central role
played by legislative history in the application of the statute. The court
referred to the legislative commission report in identifying the problem.
This report provided the basic evaluation of the fact pattern in that it
determined that such arrangements were "particularly likely to lead to
harmful effects." ' 5 The court also turned to the commission report for
further clarification of the dimensions of the problem and elaboration of
the factors to be considered in evaluating the effects of the arrangement.
In short, the legislative preparation process yielded an authoritative
framework for analysis of the situation.
The case also exemplifies the use of the concept of efficiency in
102. No. 1983:2 at 62.
103. Id at 63.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 59.
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Swedish antitrust analysis. As discussed above, 10 6 the concept of effi-
ciency in Swedish antitrust law differs significantly from the concept of
efficiency currently used in United States antitrust law. Whereas effi-
ciency in United States antitrust law is currently a static concept of
microeconomic price theory, efficiency in Swedish antitrust law is an eco-
nomic process concept which asks whether private arrangements tend to
preserve existing market structures.
In Boras, the division of markets eliminated virtually all intrabrand
competition. In so doing, it eliminated important incentives for distribu-
tors to improve their services and reduce their costs. A critical element
in the resulting harm was the fact that the arrangement tended to pre-
serve existing market structures. The lack of incentives for intrabrand
competition tended to "stiffen" the market and reduce the likelihood of
adaptation and change in the market. A related factor was the fact that
the division of markets made it impossible for national organizations to
purchase on a national level. The court found that this arrangement
hampered the development of the markets involved and was, therefore,
inefficient within the meaning of the statute.
B. Vertical Restraints
Swedish antitrust law is also applicable to vertical restraints, i.e.,
restraints involving more than one level in the chain of distribution. The
severity of Swedish antitrust law in this area has not diminished in recent
years, whereas United States antitrust law has recently become increas-
ingly tolerant of some types of vertical restraints.10 7 This Article reviews
three types of vertical restraints which have been important concerns of
Swedish antitrust law and which highlight particular characteristics of
the system. These restraints are resale price maintenance, exclusive deal-
ing and unilateral refusals to deal.
1. Resale Price Maintenance
As previously mentioned, 10 8 resale price maintenance, also called
"vertical price fixing," is one of two types of restraints which are specifi-
cally forbidden under Swedish law. Resale price maintenance cases are
prosecuted in the ordinary courts, which have only to determine whether
resale price maintenace has actually occurred.1 °9 The courts are not
106. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
107. See, eg., R. BORK, supra note 4, ch. 14.
108. See supra text accompanying note 71.
109. For a review of some of the case law, see Nerep, supra note 6, at § 2.01(3)(a).
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asked to engage in economic analysis.
The case law concerning resale price maintenance has been limited.
What is of interest here is the analysis which dictates statutory treatment
of resale price maintenance as a per se violation. The reasons for singling
out resale price maintenance for this per se treatment center on promot-
ing efficiency and international competitiveness. According to the report
of the commerce minister in 1953,
The most serious disadvantage of the resale price maintenance system
is that it deters rationalization and thus potential price reductions at
the retail level. This is based primarily on the fact that in this system
the sales price of a good is basically determined by the retail merchant
with the highest costs. In distribution the incentive is lost which is
provided by free price formation.
110
The government was concerned with the structure-preserving and thus
inefficient effects of resale price maintenance.
The drafters of the LRC were particularly concerned with resale
price maintenance because it had been very widely practiced in Sweden
during the postwar period, especially with branded goods."1 Resale
price maintenance was, in fact, so widespread that it excluded all retail
level competition in large areas of the economy. Resale price mainte-
nance was made a per se violation in order to break this pattern and
generate price reductions. 112 The generally harmful and inefficient effects
of the system appeared clear, and there seemed to be no offsetting
advantages.
This attitude has not changed. The prohibition against resale price
maintenance was not even contested in the recent legislative investigation
of the antitrust laws. According to Sweden's foremost antitrust expert,
"[t]he prohibition against resale price maintenance constitutes the basic
legal requisite for the extensive price competition which has developed
throughout much of business life."113
In the United States resale price maintenance is also illegal per se,
but the reasoning on which the prohibition is based differs significantly
from Swedish doctrine. The basis for the United States position has been
the questionable analogy between vertical price fixing and horizontal
price fixing." 4 This analogy has been strongly criticized. 1 5 Under
110. Prop. 1953:103, at 169.
111. See U. BE.Nrrz, supra note 52, at 72.
112. A. MARTENIus, supra note 26, at 65-66.
113. U. BERNrrz, supra note 52, at 73.
114. The leading case is Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373
(1911).
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Swedish antitrust law, however, resale price maintenance is deemed inef-
ficient because it eliminates intrabrand price competition at the retail
level and freezes market structures. Such practices are particularly
harmful where they involve a high percentage of the sellers in a particu-
lar market. This was the case in Sweden after World War II because
price controls had facilitated widespread reliance on set prices. Today
the potential for harm from resale price maintenance is associated with
the phenomenon of increasing concentration, a phenomenon which is oc-
curring in both the United States and Sweden.
2. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Recently, Swedish antitrust law enforcement has also focused on ex-
clusive dealing arrangements. In general, exclusive dealing arrangements
of the most common type, i.e., exclusive sales agencies, have not been
attacked by the ombudsman. The ombudsman's main concern has been
with those areas of the economy in which small retailers are dependent
upon strong sellers. Both the ombudsman and the market court have
found harmful effects primarily where exclusive dealing arrangements
were widespread in a given market.116
A leading decision on exclusive dealing is Scan Vast. 117 Scan Vast
(Scan) is a leading producer of meat products in western Sweden. Its
legal character is that of an economic association, and it was created by
the merger of several producers of certain meat products. In this case
the ombudsman attacked Scan's exclusive arrangements involving "street
kitchens." '118 Three major producers in western Sweden sold to such
kitchens, with Scan and one other producer each having between thirty-
five and forty percent of the market, and a third producer having approx-
imately twenty percent. Scan had a variety of arrangements for its kitch-
ens, including arrangements by which it owned the kitchens and leased
them to independent operators, and others in which it provided financing
to independent owners. Such arrangements often included provisions re-
115. See, eg., R. BORK, supra note 4, at 32-33, 285-91. Viewed from the price-theory per-
spective, resale price maintenance may in fact create distributive efficiency. According to
Bork, "[w]hen a manufacturer wishes to impose resale maintenance. . . or any other restraint
upon the rivalry of resellers, his motive cannot be the restriction of output and, therefore, can
only, be the creation of distributive efficiency." Id. at 289.
116. U. BERNrrZ, supra note 52, at 83.
117. N.O. v. Scan Vist ek for (No. 1982:10), 1981 PRIs OCH KARTELLFRAGOR 82 (herein-
after cited as Scan).
118. Street kitchens are sidewalk or park stands which generally sell food products such as
hamburgers and sausages. They are common in Swedish cities. The street kitchens sometimes
also provide enclosed seating areas.
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quiring that the kitchens buy all of their meat products from Scan. Scan
operated in a geographic area in which it had approximately 600 kitchen
customers and about 150 contracts containing exclusive dealing
requirements.
The market court held that these arrangements eliminated a signifi-
cant amount of competition. According to the court:
Through these exclusive provisions and their counterparts, purchase
obligations, which other street kitchen suppliers have also secured
from their customers, long-ran ties have been created between suppli-
ers with a strong market position and numerous street kitchens which
must limit themselves to one supplier.... Competition at the sup-
plier level is, therefore, eliminated in a significant part of the present
market.119
As a result, these arrangements met the effects criteria.
The price criterion was met because the arrangements reduced both
intrabrand and interbrand price competition. Regarding interbrand
competition, the court said, "[tlhe fact that competing suppliers are pre-
vented from selling to contractually bound kitchens means that for these
suppliers a sector of the direct kitchen market cannot be affected by par-
ticular means of competition, and this is intended to weaken price com-
petition."12 The court also found that intrabrand price competition was
prevented because the individual kitchens could not purchase at lower
prices in order to compete against each other.
According to the court, this system also hindered the business of
both the sellers and the kitchen owners, and thus it met the third of the
effects criteria. The kitchen owners were prevented from making the
most advantageous purchases and thus from operating efficiently; the
suppliers lost their freedom of action by being precluded from competing
for customers. Moreover, the exclusive dealing arrangement increased
barriers to entry into the market.
The court also discussed the problem of "impaired development op-
portunities." According to the court, "[l]imiting [the kitchens] to a par-
ticular supplier's particular assortment also reduces their capacity to
adjust to consumer demand. . . . Exclusiveness thus has an impact on
the developmental opportunities of the kitchens. . . and hinders the de-
velopment of assortments which are well adapted to consumer
wishes." '121 The harm was again found in the reduced capacity of the
119. Scan, supra note 117, at 96.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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market as well as of the individual enterprises to adapt and develop to
meet changes in consumer demand.
When the court looked to possible justifications for this system, it
found none which were of sufficient weight to counteract the system's
negative effects. Scan argued that this type of arrangement was necessary
for it to provide financing to many kitchens. The court found, however,
that there was no indication that this financing had a positive effect on
competition by improving the conditions for market entry. Scan also ar-
gued that if it were not allowed to have such provisions, it would need to
open its own kitchens in order to achieve the advertising advantages
made possible by exclusivity. In the court's view this would not be a
sufficient basis for justifying the system, even if it were a necessary result
of prohibiting exclusivity. The court emphasized that "from a general
competition perspective an important principle would be violated if sup-
pliers with a strong market position could apply anticompetitive provi-
sions of this kind against certain customers which are dependent on them
as a result of financial support or rental agreements."'
22
3. Unilateral Refusals to Deal
Refusals to deal constitute the largest category of cases brought
under Swedish antitrust law, both at the ombudsman and the market
court levels. 123 In the United States, a unilateral refusal to deal may es-
tablish a violation of the Sherman Act 24 where it constitutes exclusion-
ary conduct by a monopolist or would-be monopolist, or where it
enforces some other anticompetitive arrangement. If, for example, a
manufacturer terminates a dealer as part of a program to coerce adher-
ence to specified prices, the refusal may be a central element in a result-
ing violation based on resale price maintenance.2 5 The analysis is
directed to the purpose behind the refusal to deal, and intent becomes an
important element in the analysis.
Under Swedish law, a refusal to deal is deemed to be a restraint of
competition. 126 Whether it constitutes a violation of the statute depends
on its effects. As in the United States, an individual refusal to deal may
constitute a violation where it is used to enforce a proscribed anti-
competitive arrangement. More important for this discussion, however,
are cases in which a violation is found on the basis of the type of enter-
122. Id. at 98.
123. See S. HOLMBERG, supra note 24, at 99.
124. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (original version at 26 Stat. 209 (1890)),
125. See, eg., United States v. Parke-Davis & Co. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
126. For a discussion of cases in this area, see Nerep supra note 6, at § 3.02(2)(c).
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prise to which delivery is refused. In such cases the question of intent is
eliminated. If delivery is refused to an enterprise which has certain char-
acteristics, the refusal itself may be deemed to bring about the harmful
effects. A refusal to deal will, for example, generally have the requisite
harmful effects where the refused enterprise represents a particular distri-
bution form. 27 The theory is that such a refusal is likely to inhibit eco-
nomic efficiency within the industry. This occurs, for example, where a
manufacturer refuses to sell to a low-price or discount retailer or chain.
According to the legislative history, a refusal to deal with discount retail-
ers is particularly likely to lead to harmful effects. 2 '
This idea was developed in the Sundsvall case. 12 9 In that case a self-
service supermarket attempted to enter the market in a Swedish city in
which traditional family-owned grocery stores had not yet been replaced
by more modem retail stores. The local wholesalers refused to make
deliveries to the self-service market. Although the wholesalers claimed
that their refusals were based on lack of confidence in the new supermar-
ket and its president, a major reason for the refusal appeared to be pres-
sure from existing retail outlets which feared the new competition. There
was, however, no indication that these competitors were acting in
concert.
The court turned for guidance to the legislative history of the LRC,
which stated that refusals to deal based on the form or type of enterprise
were likely to have harmful effects. According to the court,
Such a discrimination is particularly objectionable in our view when it
is designed to hinder types of enterprises which attempt to use new
methods or which show the desire to compete actively, price competi-
tion being included. Such a discrimination would, if it were successful,
contribute in an unfortunate way to conserving existing forms and
methods of business and impeding the rationalization of business struc-
tures. This becomes harmful from an economic standpoint .... It is
in the nature of competition that varieties of distribution forms must
be tested and be allowed to show what they can accomplish. 130
The court held that the refusal to deal with the self-service market was a
violation of the LRC beause the refusal impeded change and adaptation
in the industry. The court also suggested that such refusals could rarely
be justified.
127. For a review of such cases, see SOU 1978:9, at 113-117.
128. Prop. 1953:103, at 179.
129. N. 0. v. Vissa Partihandelsf6retag med F~rsiljning av Kolonialvaror och Djupfrysta
Varor i Sundsvallomradet, N~ringsfrihetsradets Beslut 1954-1963 298 (No. 1958:14).
130. Id. at 291.
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A 1983 case involving a Swedish subsidiary of a foreign corporation
provides a modem example of this type of analysis. The case was
brought by the competition ombudsman against the Swedish representa-
tive of the makers of Certina watches for refusing to sell Certina watches
to Ur and Penn, a leading discount seller of watches with approximately
thirty percent of the Swedish watch market. 131
The high-priced watch market in Sweden is dominated by Seiko,
Certina and Citizen. Ur and Penn had had an exclusive right to sell
Seiko watches in Sweden for many years when, in 1979, Seiko established
its own subsidiary in Sweden. Seiko's management then decided to in-
crease the prices for its watches by selling not only to Ur and Penn but
also to the traditional jewelry stores, which generally sold at higher
prices. In response, Ur and Penn sought to reduce its dependence on
Seiko by seeking to sell Certina and Citizen watches as well as Seiko
watches. Max Huttner, the general agent for the Swiss manufacturer of
Certina, refused to sell to Ur and Penn.
The market court held that this refusal had a direct price-increasing
effect because it reduced Ur and Penn's ability to use price as a method of
competition. According to the court,
The traditional retail stores now have the possibility of selling the
dominant brand names in this specialized portion of the market, while
Ur and Penn has only Seiko. Against this background it can be as-
serted that Ur and Penn no longer has the opportunity to compete
with the traditional stores on the same terms. What has been
presented here indicates in our view that Ur and Penn's ability to use
price as a method of competition in this situation may have been
reduced. 132
The court recited the legislative history suggesting that refusals to deal
that are directed at specific types of enterprises are likely to cause harm-
ful effects and concluded that this had occurred here.
The court also found that such refusals hampered efficiency in busi-
ness and therefore met the second of the harmful effects criteria. It re-
viewed the factors which allowed Ur and Penn to sell at prices lower
than those of its competitors. These included, primarily, economies of
scale in warehousing and distribution and' buying power resulting from
its size. It concluded that the refusal to deal had a negative effect on
business efficiency because it meant that Ur and Penn's "rational struc-
ture and cost savings cannot be fully exploited in the consumer's
131. N.O. v. Max Huttner AB (No. 1983:4) (stencil not yet published).
132. Id. at 19.
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interests."133
Certina argued that this refusal to sell was based on the fact that Ur
and Penn did not maintain the level of service available in traditional
jewelry stores. The court found that the levels of service at Ur and Penn
were generally lower but nevertheless generally acceptable to customers.
From this the court concluded that the negative effects of the restraint on
competition were not outweighed by their societal benefits.
VI. CONCLUDING COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVES
The Swedish experience with antitrust law has been influenced by
many factors, including the size and international economic relations of
the country, its political system and its legal and business cultures. The
result is an antitrust system which is unique and which provides valuable
insights into the phenomenon of antitrust laws. A comparison of ele-
ments of the Swedish system with the vastly dissimilar United States an-
titrust system provides additional insights into both systems.
A. The Goals of Antitrust Law
In both Sweden and the United States, the basic goals of antitrust
law relate to protecting the competitive process from distortion through
restraints on competition. Notwithstanding this basic similarity in objec-
tive, there are significant differences between the two systems with regard
to the status and role of these goals in the legal system, and the relation-
ship between stated goals and their implementation.
In Sweden the goals of antitrust law are explicit. They have been
carefully formulated in the process of preparing antitrust legislation, and
the formulations are based on widespread agreement between political
and industrial interests. Antitrust law is accepted as an instrument of
economic policy, the main thrust of which is to foster economic
development.
Moreover, the goals of Swedish antitrust law are anchored in the
process by which the law is applied. They are reflected in the structure
of the antitrust statutes, and, because legislative history plays a key role
in the process of applying the statute, they serve as guides to the handling
of particular cases and the development of legal principles. The Swedish
experience illustrates the systemic benefits of having a clearly articulated
set of goals and a statute which reflects and orders those goals. This
133. Id.
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clear articulation of goals provides valuable guidelines for interpretation
of the statute.
In contrast, the goals and values of United States antitrust law are
often unclear. In fact, controversy surrounding antitrust law in the
United States in recent years has centered largely around what the goals
of antitrust law should be. Antitrust case law reflects a broad spectrum
of political and economic goals in which there is little order or structure.
As a result, important areas of antitrust law have become confusing and
inconsistent. Consequently, influential critics such as Judge Robert Bork
have vigorously argued that the only proper goal of antitrust law is con-
sumer welfare. 34 Other leading experts argue, however, that antitrust
law must continue to seek greater consistency while taking into account
political and social goals and values as well as economic objectives other
than the maximization of short run consumer welfare.13 5
An important reason for this controversy is that in the United States
there exists no mechanism which requires or even encourages the careful
formulation of goals. Explicit and authoritative review of the goals of
antitrust law can be achieved only through legislation, but there have
been no major changes in United States antitrust statutes since the Clay-
ton Act was passed in 1914.136 Moreover, the central antitrust statute,
the Sherman Act, 137 was passed almost a century ago, and its legislative
history has ceased to have much relevance.13 8
The recent controversy ignited by the economics-in-law movement
has rekindled interest in the goals of antitrust. A central argument of the
so-called "Chicago school" is that the exclusive goal of antitrust law
must be consumer welfare as defined by neoclassical price theory, for it is
only in this way that the United States can have a rational, i.e. consistent,
antitrust policy.139 The Chicago school argues that the existing multi-
valued system necessarily produces confusing and inconsistent case
law. 40 The argument rests, however, on the assumption that courts
134. See R. BORK, supra note 4.
135. See, eg., Fox, supra note 4; Pitofsky, supra note 4; Sullivan, supra note 4.
136. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976) (original version at 38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
137. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (original version at 26 Stat, 209 (1890)).
138. The legislative history of the Sherman Act discusses the goals of antitrust in rclation
to specific economic problems and a particular legal context. Both the specific economic
problems and the legal context have changed greatly since the Sherman Act was passed,
Moreover, the legislative history has been studied by courts and commentators who have
reached vastly differing conclusions about its contents. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4, at 1152-55.
139. See, eg., R. POSNER, supra note 2, ch. 9. The "Chicago School" is discussed by one of
its leading proponents in Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV,
925 (1979).
140. R. BQRK, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
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must remain solely responsible for the development of antitrust law. The
underlying notion is that the goals of antitrust law must be simplified
because courts are unable to achieve a reasonable conceptual structure in
a multi-goal context. There is, however, no apparent reason why clear
goals and an effective conceptual structure cannot be developed else-
where within the system, as, for example, by Congress or by an independ-
ent commission.
B. The Processes of Antitrust Law
A comparison of the process of applying antitrust law in the two
countries suggests two very different conceptions of the nature of anti-
trust law. Sweden treats antitrust as a separate and unique kind of law,
subject to its own rules and administered by special legal institutions. It
views antitrust law as a legal subsystem in which the institutions apply-
ing the law perform functions for which those institutions are designed.
The traditional legal functions of characterization, statutory construction
and balancing of interests have well-defined roles, as does the economic
analysis function. Institutions within the system have traditional legal
competence, but they also incorporate the competence to perform the
required economic analysis. The conceptual structure which is applied,
and the process by which it is applied, function together as a system.
In the United States, in contrast, there is little coordination of the
different components of the antitrust system. Antitrust law is treated like
any other law. It is applied primarily by the ordinary courts, and the
basic analytical method used is the traditional judicial tool of "reasoning
by analogy." Analogical reasoning has tended, however, to function
poorly in the antitrust context due to the extraordinary complexity of
many antitrust cases. Moreover, the ordinary courts admittedly have
only limited competence to engage in the economic analysis which is
often required.141 Thus from a systemic perspective, the institutions and
processes used to apply antitrust law in the United States may be inade-
quate or inappropriate for certain of the tasks assigned to them.
C. The Role of Economics
The importance of systemic considerations is particularly evident
with respect to the role of economics. In both Sweden and the United
States, economic analysis plays a central role in antitrust law. Yet that
role differs significantly in the two systems, as does the content of the
respective analyses.
141. See, eg., U.S. v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
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In Sweden the roles of economics are clearly defined. The effects
criteria are at the center of the statutory structure; a restraint may consti-
tute a violation only where it causes specific economic effects. The pri-
mary role of economics is to determine whether it has done so or is likely
to do so. Since economics is a science the primary function of which is to
identify and predict the economic consequences of behavior, the law thus
poses questions which economic analysis is designed to answer.
The same is true with regard to the second role which economics
plays in Swedish antitrust law. If harmful effects are established, there is
the further issue of whether societal benefits flowing from the restraint
outweigh these effects. Although a variety of factors may be considered
here, most of those which have been accorded weight by the ombudsman
and the market court have been economic. The primary consideration
has been the identification and evaluation of the long run economic ef-
fects of the competitive restraints. Again, economic analysis is designed
to perform the task which the law has assigned it.
Moreover, economic analysis is built into the process in operational
terms. Economists participating in legislative commissions identify basic
patterns of cause and effect and establish these patterns as guideposts for
analysis. The adaptational issues to which the statute is primarily ad-
dressed are identified and their likely applications to particular contexts
are clarified. Thus economic analysis on a principled and generalized
level is integrated into the legal mechanism. Moreover, economists are
part of both the market court and the Office of the Ombudsman, thereby
incorporating economic competence into the institutions applying the
law.
Defining the role of economics also determines the types of eco-
nomic analysis to be applied in particular cases. The price criterion, for
example, requires macroeconomic price theory analysis, whereas the
public interest criterion may involve long term structural development
analysis. Though there may be differences in the way individual econo-
mists analyze the specifics of a given case, the general type of analysis to
be applied follows from the nature of the effects to be analyzed.
In contrast, the role of economics in United States antitrust law is
often unclear. There is no clearly identifiable role for economics in the
statutes; economic competence is not incorporated into the institutions
which must apply the law; and there is little guidance as to what kind of
economic analysis to apply in any given situation.
United States antitrust statutes provide no explicit role for economic
analysis. The Sherman Act states, for example, that restraints of trade
are illegal, but the term "restraint of trade" can be defined only by refer-
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ence to case law developments. Following common law tradition, the
issue is thus whether a set of facts fits within categories developed by
judicial reasoning. The analytical process involved is the traditional legal
process of characterization. The development of a rule of reason requires
that a court look at all factors surrounding a restraint to determine
whether there has been a substantial anticompetitive effect. This indi-
rectly introduces economic issues into the decision. The decisional crite-
rion is, however, whether a restraint is "anticompetitive," and, except in
relation to certain horizontal restraints, attempts to relate that concept to
economic analysis have been strained.1 42
Therefore, the questions posed by United States antitrust law are
often questions which economic analysis is not designed to answer. The
required analysis remains one of characterization and analogy in which
economics plays an indirect and often uncertain role.
There is also a lack of clarity regarding the kind of economic analy-
sis to be applied in United States antitrust law. Where the law asks
whether a restraint is likely to increase prices, an economist knows to
turn to microeconomic price theory. Where the law asks whether a re-
straint is anticompetitive, the role of economics is unclear, because the
question involves a legal rather than an economic concept.
Finally, the effectiveness of economic analysis under the United
States system is impeded by the fact that economic competence is incor-
porated to only a limited extent in the institutions which apply the anti-
trust laws. The ordinary courts have primary responsibility for
developing antitrust law. Yet individual judges, not to mention juries,
are unlikely to have economic competence, and the system provides little
authoritative guidance with respect to the application of economic princi-
ples in the antitrust context.
A comparison of the Swedish and United States antitrust systems
suggests that the role of economics is a critical factor in the effective
operation of such systems. It also suggests that assigning economic anal-
ysis a clear analytical role may be important to achieving overall analyti-
cal clarity in antitrust systems.
142. Professor Bork, after reviewing several definitions of "competition" which are some-
times used by the courts, argues for the following definition largely on the grounds of economic
rationality and consistency of application:
[Competition is]... a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating any state of
affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative
state of affairs through judicial decree. Conversely, "monopoly" and "restraint of
trade' would be terms of art for situations in which consumer welfare could be so
improved. ...
R. BORK, supra note 4, at 61.
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